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Over the last fifteen years or so, Loïc Wacquant has not merely helped lay the epistemo-
logical foundations for interrogating the relationship between neoliberalism and penality, 
nor has he confined himself to the empirical scrutiny of various and varying jurisdictions 
with a view to ‘tracking the circulation of punitive discourses, norms, and policies elabo-
rated in the United States as constituent ingredients of the neoliberal government of social 
inequality’ (Wacquant, 2009a: 172). Wacquant has also grown to become one of the most 
vocal public critics of neoliberal penality internationally (see further Loader and Sparks, 
this issue). Indeed, whilst travelling across the world in his capacity as a public intellec-
tual, Wacquant came to acknowledge that ‘the diffusion of neoliberal penality is not only 
more advanced, but also more diversified and more complex than portrayed [in his 
Prisons of Poverty]’. For example, ‘just as there are varieties of capitalism, there are 
many paths down the road to market rule, and thus many possible routes to the penalisa-
tion of poverty’ (2009a: 175). Hence, ultimately, the ‘invitation’ to his readers around the 
globe to take up and advance the study of penal policy and practice from a political 
economy perspective (2009a: 176). The invitation arrives with no strings attached. To 
paraphrase Wacquant’s own salute to Bourdieusian anti-dogmatism, an invitation to think 
with Wacquant is of necessity an invitation to think beyond Wacquant, and against him 
whenever required (Wacquant, 1992a: xiv). 
Neoliberalism, according to Wacquant, is a ‘transnational political project aiming to 
remake the nexus of market, state, and citizenship from above’. It is carried out by a ‘new 
global ruling class in the making’, spanning the heads and senior executives of transna-
tional firms, high-ranking politicians, state managers and top officials of multinational 
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organisations (e.g. the IMF and the World Bank), as well as cultural–technical experts 
in their employ (e.g. legal and media professionals) (Wacquant, 2009b: 306–7). Wacquant 
elaborates that neoliberalism entails not only the reassertion of the dynamic of capitalist 
production and market exchange, but the articulation of four institutional logics: economic 
deregulation; the withdrawal of welfare protection; the cultural trope of individual respon-
sibility; and an evermore expansive penal apparatus. Rather, then, than being a deviation 
from neoliberalism, penality is one of its essential components. More specifically, at the 
same time as publicly repudiating intervention in economic and social matters to ensure 
national competitiveness on the global stage, neoliberal states promote the ‘new “punitive 
common sense” forged in the United States’ (Wacquant, 2009a: 162), which is to say that 
they elevate criminal insecurity and punishment to the frontline of governmental priorities. 
The underlying aim is to manage the social reverberations of ‘advanced social insecurity’ 
that neoliberal policies generate amongst the lower and middle classes. At the bottom 
of the class structure, punishment works to contain the disorders caused by the ‘objective 
insecurity’ of flexibilised wage labour and social-welfare retrenchment (2009a: 93). 
Concurrently, punishing the poor creates a convenient outlet for the ‘subjective’ insecurity 
experienced by the middle classes, ‘whose prospects for smooth reproduction or upward 
mobility have dimmed as competition for valued social positions has intensified and the 
state has reduced its provision of public goods’ (Wacquant, 2009b: 300). As such, punish-
ment of the nether regions of social space compensates for the deficit in legitimacy suf-
fered by state leaders on the economic and social fronts.
Our aim in this article is to put Wacquant’s neoliberal penality thesis to the test within 
the Greek context. Of late, Greece has been the focus of considerable international atten-
tion, not simply in relation to the financial crisis there, but also in connection with issues 
of law and order. Wacquant, for his part, includes Greece amongst the countries that have 
joined the ‘“Washington consensus” on punishment’ (Wacquant, 2009a: 3). But whilst he 
addresses the Greek case in broad-brush cross-country comparisons, he does not delve 
into national historical complexities or other empirical details. This omission obscures 
important insights both into Greece as such and, more generally, into the relationship 
between neoliberalism and penality. Indeed, Greece readily lends itself to a critical eval-
uation of the degree to which penal policies incubated in America are globalised as part 
of the dispersion of neoliberalism. On the one hand, Greece has shared the general inter-
national trend in rising punitiveness over recent years. On the other hand, as a post- 
dictatorial society, it has known intense periods of punitiveness within living memory. 
Furthermore, as a semi-peripheral country of the world economy, Greece has experi-
enced a different trajectory of capitalist development compared to core Western states.1
We begin by examining trends in punitiveness in Greece as expressed through indica-
tors of imprisonment (though, of course, one could follow Wacquant in exploring addi-
tional facets of the criminal justice system such as policing). Our method differs from 
Wacquant’s in two important ways. First, rather than use one-day snapshot censuses 
of the prison population, we draw on indicators that allow a fuller grasp of the use of 
imprisonment: the annual caseload of offenders held in custody and the duration of 
stay behind bars, as determined both by the length of sentence and the occurrence of 
early release.2 And second, rather than restrict the analysis to ‘the past dozen years’ (by 
which Wacquant (2009b: 88) means the period 1985–2000), we take a longer perspec-
tive. To locate the root causes of a given trend, it is necessary not only to trace its 
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inception, but also to contextualise its evolution vis-à-vis past points of comparison.3 
Although we discover ample compelling evidence of intense and growing punitiveness 
in contemporary Greece, it turns out that punitive trends anticipated the recent advent of 
neoliberal policy-making in the country, and indeed have starker precedents throughout 
the twentieth century. Whilst the former leaves neoliberalism with a limited penal role 
at most – that of enhancing, as opposed to engendering, the revitalised expansion of 
imprisonment –, the latter draws attention to the forms and functions of state power 
characteristic of the capitalist semi-periphery. 
That neoliberalism bears little pertinence to the Greek case becomes all the more 
evident when one shifts the focus of attention from the penal realm to the history of wel-
fare and economic regulation in the country. True to its semi-peripheral status, Greece 
has long known both insufficient provision of social welfare – even if related expenditure 
has undergone an overall upward trend over the last fifty years – and widespread infor-
mal flexibility in labour relations. Although neoliberal reforms were introduced at the 
policy-making level as of the 1990s, they remained partial in scope, and were imple-
mented slowly and patchily. In all, then, whilst we support Wacquant’s call for ‘bringing 
developments in welfare and criminal justice into a single theoretical framework equally 
attentive to the instrumental and expressive moments of public policy’ (Wacquant, 
2009a: 175), we find neoliberalism wanting as an explanation of punitiveness in Greece 
today. Instead, and to the extent that space allows, we point to the configuration of social, 
political, and economic tensions and conflicts representative of semi-peripheral socie-
ties. Sharing Wacquant’s concern for ‘epistemic reflexivity’, whereby appreciating the 
procedures and effects of intellectual practice is a necessary condition of any critical 
theory of society (see further Wacquant, 1992b: 36–46), we conclude with some thoughts 
on the political dangers of the neoliberal penality thesis. 
Punitiveness in Greece: Tracing Carceral Trends
In arguing the case that neoliberal penality has traversed US borders and spread through-
out Europe and Latin America, Wacquant asks us to consider a host of trends, including 
booming rates of imprisonment, disproportionately lower levels of crime, and the over-
representation of drug offenders, foreigners, and the poor (three commonly overlapping 
categories) in prison populations. Below we explore these facets of the neoliberal penal-
ity thesis within the Greek context. Our findings, on the one hand, confirm that the use 
of imprisonment in Greece has recently undergone strong inflation; that it bears little 
relevance to crime rates; and that it impinges principally on drug offenders, foreigners, 
and the poor. On the other hand, the rise of imprisonment began before the years associ-
ated with the onset of neoliberalism in the country, and has far more dramatic anteced-
ents in living memory. Doubt is thus cast over the extent to which neoliberalism may 
have triggered a new era in Greek penal practice.
‘Carceral inflation’: 1980–2006
Wacquant speaks of a ‘swift and continuous increase in the incarceration rates in almost 
all the member nations of the European Union over the past dozen years’ (Wacquant, 
2009a: 88). Rightly, Greece does not qualify as an exception. Following a modest overall 
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decline during the 1980s, imprisonment in the country has known an explosive growth 
over the last two decades or so. 
Between 1980 and 1989, the annual total caseload of prisoners (including pre-trial 
detainees) fell by 6 percent, from 11,455 (or 119 per 100,000 inhabitants) to 10,763 
(or 107 per 100,000 inhabitants).4 This was due to a drop in the caseload of convicted 
prisoners, significant enough to overshadow the contemporaneous rise in the caseload of pre-
trial detainees. On the one hand, the caseload of pre-trial detainees increased by 22.8 
percent between 1980 and 1989, from 3,269 (or 34 per 100,000 inhabitants) to 4,015 (or 
40 per 100,000 inhabitants), with the proportion of pre-trial detainees amongst the total 
prisoner caseload also rising, from 28.5 percent to 37.3 percent. On the other hand, the 
caseload of convicted prisoners fell by 17.5 percent, from 8,186 (or 85 per 100,000 
inhabitants) in 1980 to 6,748 (or 67 per 100,000 inhabitants) in 1989. Correspondingly, 
the share of convicted prisoners amongst the total prisoner caseload fell from 71.4 per-
cent to 62.6 percent, although they still represented the bulk. 
Trends were overturned between 1990 and 2006. The annual total caseload of prisoners 
(including pre-trial detainees) rose by 52.6 percent, from 11,835 (or 116 per 100,000 
inhabitants) to 18,070 (or 162 per 100,000 inhabitants). This was not so much due to the 
rise in the caseload of pre-trial detainees, as in that of convicted prisoners. Whereas the 
caseload of pre-trial detainees increased by 15.3 percent between 1990 and 2006, from 
4,247 (or 42 per 100,000 inhabitants) to 4,900 (or 44 per 100,000 inhabitants), the propor-
tion of cases of pre-trial detainees amongst the total prisoner caseload fell, from 35.8 
percent to 27.1 percent. By contrast, the caseload of convicted prisoners rose by a massive 
73.5 percent, from 7,588 (or 75 per 100,000 inhabitants) in 1990 to 13,170 in 2006 
(amounting to a rate of 118 per 100,000 inhabitants, an all-time high since the fall of the 
military junta in 1974). Correspondingly, the share of cases of convicted prisoners amongst 
the total prisoner caseload increased from 64.1 percent in 1990 to 72.8 percent in 2006. 
The ‘crime-incarceration disconnect’
Even though Wacquant (2009a: 88) argues that ‘crime rose noticeably in European soci-
eties [between 1985 and 2000], whereas it stagnated in the United States’, he speaks of 
the ‘crime-incarceration disconnect’ as a universal constant across spatial and temporal 
spans. ‘[C]omparative criminology’, he writes, ‘establishes beyond contest that there 
exists no robust correlation – in any country at any time – between the rate of imprison-
ment and the level of crime’ (Wacquant, 2009b: 275; compare Nelken, this issue). As far 
as Greece is concerned, whilst (or, indeed, because) crime rates have not risen signifi-
cantly, the ‘crime-incarceration disconnect’ thesis holds true.5 
During the period 1980–2006, the annual total of police-recorded offences increased 
by 57 percent, from 295,353 to 463,750. Expressed as a rate per 100,000 inhabitants, the 
volume of crime rose by 35.8 percent, from 3,063 in 1980 to 4,160 in 2006. During the 
same period, however, the subtotal of traffic offences (e.g. speeding and illegal parking) 
increased by 95.1 percent, from 114,138 to 222,720, and by 68.8 percent as a rate per 
100,000 inhabitants, from 1,184 to 1,998. In good part, it follows, the rise in the total vol-
ume of offences was due to the rise in the volume of traffic offences, namely, offences of 
little criminological interest that only very rarely result in imprisonment. Indeed, once we 
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deduct the volume of traffic offences from the total volume of offences, we observe that 
the annual number of police-recorded crimes rose by 33 percent (from 181,215 to 241,030), 
and by a modest 15 percent as a rate per 100,000 inhabitants (from 1,879 to 2,161).6 
One way or another, the rise in police-recorded offences cannot account for the fact 
that the annual total caseload of convicted and remand prisoners rose concurrently by 
65.6 percent as an absolute number (from 10,703 in 1980 to 17,726 in 2006), by 43.2 
percent as a rate per 100,000 inhabitants (from 111 to 159), and by 24.5 percent as a rate 
per 1,000 police-recorded offences (from 59 to 73.5).7 To put it differently, the likelihood 
of dealing with crime by way of imprisonment grew by a quarter during the period 
1980–2006, whilst the likelihood of imprisonment under conviction grew even stronger: 
by 29.7 percent as such (i.e. from 41 to 53.2 as a ratio per 1,000 police-recorded offences), 
by 129.5 percent for convictions of a year or more (i.e. from 19.3 to 44.3 as a ratio per 
1,000 police-recorded offences), and by 246.1 percent for convictions of three years or 
more (i.e. from 10.4 to 36 as a ratio per 1,000 police-recorded offences). At the same 
time, the likelihood of pre-trial detention rose by 29.4 percent as a rate per 100,000 
inhabitants (from 34 to 44), and by 12.7 percent as a rate per 1,000 police-recorded 
offences (from 18 to 20.3). 
The ‘preferred clients’ of Greek prisons
In examining what he describes as the spectacular rise of incarceration around Europe, 
‘[f]rom Oslo to Bilbao and from Naples to Nottingham by way of Madrid, Marseille, and 
Munich’, Wacquant notes the increasing share of drug addicts and dealers amongst 
prison populations. This, he suggests, is because, ‘anti-drug policy serves as spear and 
screen for “a war against persons perceived as the least useful and potentially most dan-
gerous parts of the population”: the jobless, the homeless, the paperless immigrants, 
beggars, vagrants, and other social rejects of the city’ (Wacquant, 2009a: 98; the quote is 
from Christie, 1994: 69). With reference to particular countries (e.g. England and France), 
Wacquant adds that the ‘natural customers’ of European prisons are also ‘put away’ for 
property offences such as burglary and for violations of immigration statutes (see further 
Wacquant, 2009a: 93–100). This analysis applies similarly to the Greek case.
During the period 1980–1989, the most common main conviction offence fell under 
the broad category of property offences (e.g. burglary, theft, and robbery), with the per-
tinent rate rising from 22.8 percent to 34.1 percent. Drug-related crimes (e.g. illicit drug 
use, drug trafficking) ranked second, their proportion in the total caseload increasing 
from 7.6 percent to 12.8 percent. Turning to the period 1990–2006, drug-related crimes 
became the most common main conviction offence, with the pertinent rate rising from 
14.2 percent to 32.3 percent. The increase was most marked for drug trafficking (a crime 
often committed by drug addicts and commonly conflated by judges with possession of 
small quantities of drugs), which exploded from 56.8 percent to 94.2 percent as a proportion 
in the caseload of convicted drug offenders, and from 8.1 percent to 30.5 percent as a 
proportion in the total caseload of convicted prisoners. Second ranked property offences, 
whose proportion in the total caseload fell slightly, from 28 percent to 25 percent. Special 
mention needs to be made of illegal entry into, departure from, or stay in the country, 
which grew to become one of the most common offence categories amongst convicted 
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prisoners (and non-Greeks in particular). From 1993, when relevant official data were 
gathered for the first time, to 2006, it rose as a proportion in the total caseload from 6.9 
percent to 13.9 percent. 
Regarding the nationality of convicted prisoners, official data collection only began 
in 1996. Between then and 2006, the annual total caseload of non-Greek convicts rose by 
140.5 percent, from 2,253 (or 404 per 100,000 non-Greek inhabitants) to 5,420 (or 559 
per 100,000 non-Greek inhabitants). Correspondingly, the proportion of non-Greeks 
amongst the total caseload of convicts increased from 25.3 percent to 41.1 percent – four 
times higher than the estimated share of non-Greeks in the general population of the 
country. The level and nature of criminal involvement by non-Greeks, however, leave 
much unanswered as to the driving forces behind their overrepresentation in the total 
caseload of convicted prisoners. Between 2000 and 2006, for example, the police-
recorded rate of non-Greeks amongst offenders was 1.6 times higher than the rate of 
Greeks, but the likelihood of imprisonment under conviction was 7.9 times higher for 
non-Greeks than the equivalent likelihood for Greeks. Over the same period, non-Greeks 
represented an average of 43.2 percent in the total caseload of prisoners convicted of 
a drug-related offence, but secondary analysis of police data reveals that the average 
proportion of non-Greeks amongst the perpetrators of drug offences only stood at 
10.9 percent. Expressed in terms of the ratio of rates per 100,000 population, the average 
likelihood of a non-Greek being imprisoned under conviction for a drug offence was 
9.4 times higher than the equivalent likelihood for a Greek, but the police-recorded rate of 
non-Greeks amongst the perpetrators of drug offences was only 1.5 times higher than the 
rate of Greeks.8
Finally, the majority of convicted prisoners are of working-class extraction, as illus-
trated, inter alia, by their occupational and educational background. In 1980, for instance, 
57.4 percent in the caseload of convicted prisoners had been previously employed as 
skilled or unskilled labourers, or as service workers. The rate did not change by 1989, but 
rose from 59.2 percent in 1990 to 67 percent in 2006.9 In 1993, when official data were 
first collected on the educational level of prisoners, 61 percent in the caseload of con-
victed prisoners were either illiterate or had only completed primary education, a rate 
which had increased to 75.4 percent by 2006. Foreign convicts are vastly overrepresented 
in terms of working-class occupations, but not necessarily in terms of poor educational 
history (see e.g. Aloskofis, 2005).
‘Carceral inflation’ revisited
The analysis so far lends support to core tenets of the neoliberal penality thesis. It would 
be too hasty, however, to assume that Greece has succumbed to a ‘new “punitive com-
mon sense”’ (Wacquant, 2009a: 162). As Wacquant indicates himself, levels of imprison-
ment cannot be explained without reference to the duration of sentences inflicted and 
served. He argues, for example, that ‘the ballooning of the population behind bars [in 
Europe] results from the lengthening of sentences rather than from a strong inflation in 
admissions’ (2009a: 88). Elsewhere, for instance in his account of the ‘strong upsurge in 
carceral demography’ in France, Wacquant also brings attention to the exacerbating role 
played by ‘the withering away of early releases’ (2009a: 90). These variables are not 
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merely apposite to the Greek case (see Cheliotis, 2010a); on close examination, they 
reveal that penal punitiveness in the country commenced its upward course not in the 
1990s, but in the 1980s What this implies, as clarified later in the article, is that the rise 
in penal punitiveness predated the introduction of neoliberal reforms in Greece, and that 
neoliberalism cannot, therefore, explain the trend.10 
During the period 1980–1989, the average length of stay in prison under conviction 
saw a significant 47 percent rise, from 3.8 months to 5.6 months. In terms of custodial 
sentences, there was a large expansion in the caseload of prisoners sentenced to a term of 
five to twenty years (by 77.2 percent, from 874 to 1,549), accompanied by an increase in 
the caseloads of prisoners sentenced to a term of one to three years (by 15.7 percent, from 
1,607 to 1,860), three to five years (by 4.3 percent, from 854 to 891), and life imprison-
ment (by 12.5 percent, from 167 to 188). In 1989, the caseload of prisoners sentenced to 
a term of one to three years was the highest (27.5 percent), followed closely by the 
caseload of prisoners sentenced to a term of five to twenty years (22.9 percent). Not, 
then, that the judiciary was more liberal in their use of custodial sentences during the 
1980s, but their traditionally punitive mentality (on which see further Cheliotis, 2010b) 
manifested itself in the expanding use of long custodial sentences, more so than in the 
use of custodial sentences as such. 
As regards the period 1990–2006, the average length of stay in prison under conviction 
underwent a meteoric 1,337 percent rise, from 5.1 months to 73.3 months (or 6.1 years). 
In terms of custodial sentences, there was a huge expansion in the caseload of prisoners 
sentenced to terms of three to five years (by 323.3 percent, from 616 to 2,608), five to 
twenty years (by 332.7 percent, from 1,246 to 5,392), and life imprisonment (by 155.1 
percent, from 270 to 689). The caseload of prisoners sentenced to a term of five to twenty 
years was by far the highest (40.9 percent) in 2006. There has thus been a durable parallel 
trend towards longer stays in prison under conviction and the use of ever-longer custodial 
sentences, a trend which gathered momentum during the 1980s and exploded thereafter.
Turning to early discharge from prison, during the period 1980–1989, the annual 
caseload of convicted prisoners released for any reason dropped by 35.3 percent, from 
5,701 to 3,688, which was also a significant fall in proportion to the annual caseload of 
convicted prisoners, from 69.6 percent to 54.6 percent. As concerns more particularly 
the caseload of convicted prisoners released on parole, it increased by 17.8 percent 
between 1980 and 1989, from 381 to 449, but this was only a small rise in proportion 
to the caseload of convicted prisoners, from 4.6 percent to 6.6 percent. We might 
deduce that the judiciary (Local Misdemeanours Councils in the case of parole) exhib-
ited far greater propensity to pass long custodial sentences than to grant release on 
parole, and that parole eligibility was delayed in good part due to the ever-increasing 
length of custodial sentences. It is not implausible that lengthier sentences served as 
the means by which judges managed to control the release process before offenders 
were even put behind bars.
Over the period 1990–2006, the annual caseload of convicted prisoners released for 
any reason increased by 46.1 percent, from 4,021 to 5,876, but fell in proportion to the 
annual caseload of convicted prisoners, from 52.9 percent to 44.6 percent. Due largely to 
legislative interventions designed to pre-empt impending turmoil amongst prisoners, the 
caseload of convicted prisoners released on parole saw a huge 392.3 percent increase 
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between 1990 and 2006, from 600 to 2,954, which was also a significant rise in propor-
tion to the annual total caseload of convicted prisoners, from 7.9 to 22.4 percent. But this 
upward trend has not been consistent over time; indeed, it has been slightly reversed in 
recent years. In any case, parole alone could not have arrested the rise in the caseload of 
convicted prisoners. Although parole has become the most common reason for discharge 
of convicts, increasing as a percentile proportion of the caseload of all discharges from 
14.9 in 1990 to 50.3 in 2006, the rates of discharge for other reasons (e.g. conversion of 
sentence into monetary penalty, work-related ‘good-time’ credits) either fell or rose 
insignificantly during the same period (see further Cheliotis, 2010a). With its discretion-
ary powers left essentially untouched over the years, the judiciary has managed to ensure 
that ‘front-door’ entries to the prison system are not offset by ‘back-door’ releases (see 
further Cheliotis, 2010b).
The punitive twentieth century
A longer historical perspective provides a valuable lens through which to compare and con-
textualise punitive trends in Greece as manifested in the use of imprisonment. Such perspec-
tive immediately reveals the persistence of penal punitiveness in the country as a key 
mechanism by which the state has sought to depress labour wages and thereby sustain profit-
making for bourgeois elites under conditions of competition in the world economy. The 
goals may be common to all states, but are more likely to be pursued through direct coercion 
in peripheral and semi-peripheral societies, such as Greece (see further Tayfur, 2003). 
Thus, for example, under the pretext of fighting Communism, the 1920s saw the 
Greek state introduce draconian measures against the spread of organised labour in order 
to maintain low wages. Particularly targeted were the large unions of the tobacco work-
ers, the majority of whom consisted of refugees from Asia Minor. Repression of the 
working classes was intensified between 1936 and 1940 under the dictatorship of General 
Metaxas. Following a wave of social unrest provoked by the mix of low wages and rising 
costs of essential foodstuffs, Metaxas rose to power promising to implement authoritar-
ian solutions to the ‘labour question’ (Mazower, 1991). His action on this promise was 
dramatically illustrated by indiscriminate mass arrests and deportations (Voglis, 2002). 
Notwithstanding scant knowledge of numbers, there is consensus that thousands were 
exiled and imprisoned on islands around Greece in the interwar period, mostly without 
trial (see further Mazower, 1991, 1997; Seferiades, 2005).
Apart from political detainment, available official data on the prison population show 
that between 1929 and 1937 the average annual caseload of convicted prisoners was 
33,200, or 499 per 100,000 inhabitants. Indeed, the year 1932 saw the officially recorded 
all-time high of 37,809 cases of convicted prisoners; a rate of 578 per 100,000 inhabit-
ants (close to five times the corresponding rate of 2006). Although the vast majority of 
imprisonment sentences were short (not beyond a year, and usually up to three months), 
and over a quarter of them were eventually converted into monetary penalties, the caseload 
of prisoners sentenced to longer terms was strikingly high by contemporary standards. In 
1937, for instance, the caseload of prisoners sentenced to a term of a year or more was 
116 per 100,000 inhabitants: 17.2 percent higher than the corresponding rate in 2006 
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(96), and nearly identical to the 2006 rate for the total caseload of convicted prisoners 
(118). As suggested earlier, however, such influence cannot but have been limited to 
aggravating ongoing trends.
Anti-communist measures dating from the 1920s were maintained with vigour in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War and throughout the Greek Civil War of 
1946–1949. Following partial relaxation from the 1950s until 1966, they were again 
implemented in full force by the military junta of 1967–1974. Overwhelmingly, such 
measures reflected the politico-economic Cold War priorities of the USA (which at the 
time dominated Greek political life), and met with the consent of those indigenous bour-
geois elites that benefited from the distribution of American financial assistance to the 
country (Tayfur, 2003). In particular, leftist guerrillas who had fought for the liberation 
of occupied Greece in 1944 were swiftly subjected to systematic persecution, in stark 
contrast to Nazi collaborators. The year 1945 saw an approximate 10,000 leftists sent to 
prison during what is known as the ‘White Terror’ (Voglis, 2002: 57). Furthermore, 
according to Voglis, ‘[a]t any given moment from 1947 to 1949, between 40,000 and 
50,000 individuals were interned in prisons and camps’ (2002: 63). 
Whilst the 1950s signalled an era of greater political stability, this was disrupted over 
the next decade, when a competing faction of the domestic bourgeoisie gained ascend-
ancy. The backlash came in 1967 with a military coup that reasserted privileges to for-
eign capital and its clientele in Greece (Tayfur, 2003). Over the seven years of the 
dictatorship, some 10,000 individuals were banished to islands and 1,700 were sentenced 
to prison terms on political grounds (Voglis, 2002: 224). Based on official data, the aver-
age annual caseload of convicted prisoners during the same period stood at 13,448, or 
152 per 100,000 inhabitants. Not included in these is the large unrecorded number of 
people subjected to short and brutal detention aimed to extract information about resist-
ance activities and deter the general population from political engagement (Diamandouros, 
1995). In 1974, the junta fell and democracy was established, a transition supported by a 
shift away from exclusive reliance on a declining US hegemon and towards the benefits 
of European Community membership. The new conditions heralded a temporary overall 
decline in the use of imprisonment. Between 1975 and 1979, the annual caseload of con-
victed prisoners fell by 16.1 percent, from 9,650 (or 107 per 100,000 inhabitants) to 
8,088 (or 85 per 100,000 inhabitants), whilst the caseload of prisoners sentenced to a 
year or more remained stable. 
Our dip into the history of twentieth-century Greece is not intended to demonstrate 
relative moderation in the use of imprisonment today, but rather points to a frightful 
prospect ahead. Indeed, the caseload of prisoners sentenced to a year or more has been 
heading rapidly towards the officially recorded levels of interwar years and appears des-
tined to overtake them soon, given that the corresponding rate of prison admissions per 
100,000 inhabitants is already significantly higher (e.g. 39 in 2006 as compared to 28 in 
1937). Moving beyond description and cautioning, the recurrent fact of penal punitive-
ness in the country underlines the prominent role of state coercion in managing capitalist 
evolution in a semi-peripheral society. This is not to deny the possibility that Greek penal 
practice has been influenced more recently by neoliberalism. Such influence, however, 
cannot but have been limited to aggravating ongoing trends. 
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Institutional (Il)logics: Welfare Retrenchment and Economic 
Deregulation in Greece
The tenuous bearing of neoliberal penality on Greek reality is further clarified and quali-
fied once we turn from the penal sphere to examine two other ‘institutional logics’ of 
neoliberalism: welfare retrenchment and economic deregulation. In Greece, trends in 
social expenditure have long been on the rise, including during the period associated 
with the coming of neoliberalism. But this is not to imply a developed welfare state, 
given that provision has remained characteristically inadequate. Indeed, the same degree 
of persistence has marked the flexibility of labour relations in the country. Despite their 
quasi-neoliberal features, both the welfare system and the labour market in Greece have 
been conditioned by the enduring semi-peripherality of the national economy. 
Underscoring this point is the late and fragmented introduction of neoliberal reforms, as 
well as their delayed and inconsistent application, which ensured that Greece would 
retain its reputation as a beacon of statism in Europe.
The expansion of welfare expenditure
Over the past half-century, Greece has experienced a general upward trend in public 
expenditure as a whole, and in welfare expenditure more specifically. Whilst this is no 
indicator of the extensiveness or quality of welfare provision, it does show that the neo-
liberal imperative of welfare retrenchment has been insignificant to the Greek case. As a 
percentage of GDP, total public expenditure in Greece rose from the 1960s onwards, but 
largely remained below European and OECD averages (see Economou, 2004; Pascual & 
Alvarez-García, 2006; Paternoster et al., 2008; OECD, 2009b). Despite regular and 
recently amplified criticisms, the size of Greece’s public sector workforce and related 
expenditure upon wages and public pensions have stayed close to average EU and OECD 
levels. Government employment, for example, was calculated at 14 percent of the total 
workforce in 2005, just below the OECD average (OECD, 2009a).11 Government wage 
expenditure had been lower than the European average in 1996, but as the latter fell 
towards 2008, Greek wage expenditure climbed above it (OECD, 2009b). 
Expenditure on social protection at the national level (e.g. housing, health, disability, 
and social exclusion provisions, as well as social insurance for pensions and unemploy-
ment benefits) also grew incrementally after the establishment of democracy in 1974, from 
just over 10 percent of GDP to over 20 percent by 1998 and nearly 24 percent by 2005 
(Maloutas and Papatheodorou, 2004), though this still stood beneath the OECD average 
(Adema and Ladaique, 2009). Whilst pensions have attracted a larger proportion of national 
social expenditure than the EU average (in 2005, for example, 51.2 percent of total benefits 
were spent on old-age and survivor benefits, as opposed to 45.9 percent amongst the 
EU-27), expenditure on pensions as a percentage of GDP has hovered close to the EU aver-
age over the 1990s and 2000s (Athens News Agency, 2003; Petrášová, 2008). 
The entrenched weaknesses of welfare provision
Despite rising social expenditure, Greece has consistently lagged behind its European 
counterparts in promoting social equality. Sustaining this failure has been the historically 
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piecemeal and minimal provision of welfare, compounded by a perverse tax environment 
Once again, the historical pattern of provision belies the pertinence of neoliberalism, even 
if here paradoxically resembling it.
Social transfers, aside from pensions, have had far less impact on the risk of poverty 
in Greece than similarly targeted transfers in the rest of the EU. In 2008, for example, 
Eurostat data ranked Greece bottom amongst the EU-27 in terms of the effectiveness of 
its social transfers in reducing the risk of poverty (Seferiades, 2006; Wolff, 2010; see also 
Lampousaki, 2010). This is hardly surprising given that welfare benefits have not been 
directed to the most vulnerable members of the population. Over the 1990s, the poorest 
30 percent received less than 30 percent of all benefit payments, whilst those with mid-
dle-class incomes benefited disproportionately from non-pension transfers at the expense 
of both lower- and higher-income groups (Förster and Pearson, 2002). Inequality has 
been further exacerbated by a system of taxation that redistributes wealth regressively, 
and by the prevalence of tax evasion (most common amongst the decile of the population 
with the highest level of income; see Papatheodorou, 2006; Matsaganis and Flevotomou, 
2010). 
Equally, and unlike the vast majority of EU-27 member-states, Greece has never pro-
vided a guaranteed income to individuals in need who cannot rely on work-based bene-
fits (Lampousaki, 2010). As emphasised by the European Committee of Social Rights 
(2010: 27), persons in need and unable to cover their basic living costs from any other 
source of income are merely entitled to a one-off financial ‘allowance’ of €234.50 and 
free medical assistance.12 Until the mid-2000s, the provision of welfare benefits was 
dependent on the tax and insurance contributions history of potential recipients, with the 
consequence that those who had never worked, who had worked little, or who were long-
term unemployed, were likely to have no entitlement to any form of welfare provision 
(see Papadopoulos, 2006). Moves over recent years to expand benefits coverage to those 
most deprived have not amounted to an income guarantee and benefits remain low and 
limited in duration (see European Committee of Social Rights, 2010; Lampousaki, 2010; 
EURES, 2010; Kousta, 2010). Rather than the state, it is families that have long been 
relied upon to provide safety nets (see e.g. Karakatsanis, 2000; Papadopoulos, 2006). 
As might well be expected, welfare provision is more generous for Greek nationals 
than for others. Greece has ratified a number of key international and European treaties 
which guarantee fundamental social rights for all, but it has been reluctant to recognise 
the status and needs of such groups as the Roma, refugees, asylum seekers, and immi-
grants more generally (see e.g. IHF et al., 2000; Sitaropoulos, 2002; Pavlou et al., 2009).13 
Although rates of asylum applications to Greece are now amongst the highest in Europe, 
the country has maintained one of the lowest rates of refugee recognition (see Papadimitriou 
and Papageorgiou, 2005; Eurostat, 2010). Moreover, no clear legal basis exists for undoc-
umented individuals and illegal migrants to claim emergency social assistance (European 
Committee of Social Rights, 2010), and, until the 1990s, basic social provision for refu-
gees and asylum seekers was provided exclusively by domestic and international NGOs 
(Black, 1994).
Apart from partial coverage, another failing of welfare provision has been the inade-
quacy of benefits. Minimum welfare benefits have been set at such low levels that they 
leave the income of recipients on or below the poverty line. In 2007, for example, the 
minimum unemployment benefit for individuals without dependents was as low as 
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€174.75 per month, well beneath the poverty threshold (European Committee of Social 
Rights, 2010). Since the 1990s, however, the retrenchment of provision in some key 
areas has coincided with expansion in others, or has even been overturned. Whilst, for 
instance, government funding and subsidies to institutions such as residential homes and 
nurseries shrank (Petmesidou, 1996, 2006; Pavlou et al., 2009), projects emerged in 
housing, health, education, and training for vulnerable and disadvantaged sections of 
the population (stimulated and supported by the EU; see e.g. Karakioulafis, 2007). In the 
case of pensions, the value of the minimum benefit fell beneath the poverty threshold in 
the second half of the 1990s (Petmesidou, 1996), but subsequently rose above it 
(European Committee of Social Rights, 2010).
In Greece, the weaknesses of welfare provision are nothing new. Socio-economic 
pressures have long been defused by the selective administering of political beneficence. 
Clientelism has ensured the co-option of specific sectoral interests by way of privileged 
access to state employment and protectionism. Indeed, over the last century, political 
affiliations and beliefs have played a central role in determining access to a wide range 
of social benefits provided on a discretionary basis by the state, including public sector 
employment (see e.g. Pagoulatos, 2003; Petmesidou, 2006). Demands for welfarist 
reforms were also stunted by the absence of Fordist industrial development and its asso-
ciated patterns of collective solidarity (Petmesidou, 1996; Petmesidou and Mossialos, 
2006). This was not mere coincidence, but rather an outcome of state design: support for 
small-scale enterprise and ownership – which would effectively curtail demand for the 
unified provision of social welfare nets – has reflected the recorded desire of Greek 
political elites to impede the growth of a working class in order to maintain socio-political 
stability (Mazower, 1991; Petmesidou, 2006). 
State backing for the gradual and selective establishment of social insurance funds 
for specific professional sectors of the workforce was to leave a durable legacy of une-
ven provision and a large proportion of the population entirely uncovered (Petmesidou, 
2006; Tikos, 2008). Particularly vulnerable have remained the self-employed and, of 
course, those working in the informal economy, both very sizeable sectors in EU com-
parison and both lacking union representation. The self-employed comprised over 21 
percent of the total workforce in 2007, which was more than twice the EU-27 average 
(see Pedersini and Coletto, 2009), whilst the informal economy has been one of the largest 
in the EU (Schneider and Buehn, 2009; Matsaganis and Flevotomou, 2010). In Greece, 
then, highly inadequate welfarism has gone hand-in-hand with an under-regulated and 
‘flexible’ economy. 
The flexible and under-regulated economy
Reflecting semi-peripheral conditions, the weakness of labour representation in Greece 
(on which see Seferiades, 1999; Matsaganis, 2006) helps to explicate not only the rela-
tively low level of wages in comparison with the rest of the EU, but also the fact that 
workers are at a far higher risk of poverty than the vast majority of their European coun-
terparts. Throughout the 1990s, labour costs in the country were the second lowest in the 
EU (Papadimitriou, 2006). Greece also had the second highest proportion of working poor 
amongst the EU-27 in 2006 (Wolff, 2010), a year when half of all employees received net 
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monthly incomes of between €501 and €1000 (Tikos, 2008), just above the poverty line 
(Eurostat, 2010). More generally, median household incomes have stood well below 
European averages (Tikos, 2008). Indeed, and despite allegations to the contrary (includ-
ing by the OECD (2010a) and IMF (2009)), the Greek labour market has long been char-
acterised by low wages, low indirect labour costs, and high flexibility (e.g. seasonal and 
part-time work, inadequate provisions for compensation and notice of job redundancies, 
and high wage elasticity; see European Committee of Social Rights, 2010; Livanos, 2010). 
As ironically evidenced by expressions of frustration amongst proponents of neoliberal-
ism in Greece, the flexibility of the country’s labour market has been entrenched in histori-
cal practices of informality rather than in formally codified rules (see further Mihail, 1996; 
Seferiades, 1999, 2003; Papadimitriou, 2006). 
Aside from the engrained flexibility of the Greek labour market, however, not even 
the emergence of mass unemployment in the 1990s can be convincingly tied to neoliber-
alism. Firstly, unemployment had already begun to climb in the 1980s: between 1980 and 
2000, the steepest rise was in 1981, when the annual rate increased by half (from 2.6 
percent to 3.9 percent). Secondly, unemployment did not follow a consistent pattern dur-
ing the period in which neoliberal policies were gaining ascendancy. Whilst the rate of 
unemployment rose over the 1990s, reaching a high of 12 percent in 1999 and henceforth 
overtaking the European average (Eurostat, 2009), it fell as of 2000 and, by the second 
half of the decade, had returned to levels of the late 1980s and early 1990s (IMF World 
Economic Outlook Database).
There is broad consensus that policies such as the dismantling of employment safe-
guards, the lowering of labour costs, the reduction of protectionism, the expansion of 
credit liberalisation, the deregulation of the market, and the privatisation of public serv-
ices, all of which challenged middle-class interests, were effectively introduced in Greece 
only after the 1980s, and were applied slowly and far less thoroughly than amongst 
the majority of OECD member-states (see e.g. Pagoulatos, 2003; Staikouras, 2004; 
Tsakalotos, 2008; Spanou, 2008; OECD, 2010a). The most compelling illustration of the 
country’s ‘low reform capacity’ has been the diluted output of repeated attempts since the 
1990s to restructure the pension system (e.g. by extending the retirement age, raising 
contributions levels, and lowering pension ceilings) (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 
2008: 114). Significant efforts to reform the labour market (e.g., by increasing compul-
sory overtime whilst reducing its costs, and relaxing limits on mass redundancies) 
emerged in the mid-1990s, and gathered momentum in the mid-2000s, but their overall 
impact is also considered to have been ‘modest’ (2008: 149). Privatisation was one of the 
policies which advanced furthest – in fact, between 2000 and 2008, Greece had one of the 
most active privatisation programmes amongst OECD member-states –, yet by 2010 the 
public sector was still judged ‘relatively large’, the use of price restrictions and market 
controls ‘pervasive’, and the general extent of government involvement in economic 
activity ‘excessive’ (OECD, 2010: 7, 17; hence the redoubling of neoliberalisation 
endeavours over recent months (see e.g. Financial Times, 2010)).
Entrenched and emergent problems of the Greek labour market are thus not plausibly 
explained by reference to a blossoming of neoliberalism, but rather to the semi-peripheral 
conditions of the economy itself. Labour market trends have reflected a national economy 
superficially strengthened by processes of EU integration, but held back by its essential 
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structural weaknesses (see e.g. Tayfur, 2003; Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2008). 
Investment from, and market access to, the EU paved the way to the enlargement of the 
national labour force, attracting more women (Kanellopoulos and Mavromaras, 1999), 
immigrants, and Greeks who would otherwise emigrate (Mihail, 1996). On the other 
hand, stubbornly low levels of investment in research and development activities 
(amongst the lowest in the EU; Seferiades, 2006), coupled with deep-seated features of 
the business sector (i.e. its composition by small and medium-sized enterprises specialis-
ing in low-tech, industry or service activities; Liagouras et al., 2003), helped to keep 
Greece trapped in its semi-peripheral state. Whilst stringent immigration policies were 
functioning alongside penal repression to confine the majority of immigrants to low-
paid, menial and technical labour (Lawrence, 2005), Greeks would increasingly find their 
aspirations – heightened in the meantime by expanding education and media consump-
tion – unmet by the domestic job market. 
Concluding Remarks
Over the past thirty years, the onslaught of consumer culture has accelerated the rise in 
social aspirations at the very same time that their satisfaction has become altogether 
more precarious. The significant drop in absolute levels of poverty experienced between 
the early 1960s and early 1980s stagnated thereafter, leaving the proportion of the popu-
lation at risk of poverty one of the highest in the EU and OECD (see further Balourdos, 
2004; Tsakloglou and Mitrakos, 2006; Lampousaki, 2010; NSSG, 2010; OECD, 2010). 
Whilst Greece also saw an overall reduction in income inequality from the mid-1980s to 
the mid-2000s (see OECD, 2009c), this slowed between 2001 and 2004 (Medgyesi, 
2008), and levels remain amongst the highest of the EU-27 (see NSSG, 2010b). The 
structure of welfarist policies has played an important role in this respect, ensuring – in 
conjunction with rising levels of taxation – that there has been no significant positive net 
transfer from the state to labour since the 1980s.14
Yet Greece also experienced significant growth in household consumption from the 
1990s onwards (by 22 percent between 1993/4 and 1998/9, and by 12.1 percent between 
1998/9 and 2004/5; NSSG, 2010a). This was facilitated by the deregulation of both con-
sumer and housing credit, which in turn produced a steep rise in household indebtedness 
(particularly amongst higher-income groups; Mitrakos et al., 2005). Although the ratio of 
household debt to national income has been comparatively low by European standards, the 
average annual rise in loans for housing and consumer goods has far outstripped that of the 
Eurozone in recent years (see Athanassiou, 2007). In 2009, a pan-European public opinion 
survey placed Greeks amongst those most likely to report serious financial problems and 
difficulties in keeping up with the payment of bills and credit commitments (Eurobarometer, 
2010). Thus, consumerist expectations have advanced at a considerably faster pace than 
poverty and inequality have declined. Moreover, consumerism has expanded upon the 
shaky foundation of indebtedness, set against the background of rising unemployment. 
To the extent, then, that imprisonment in Greece today serves to contain the anxieties 
and ensuing disorders at the lower levels of the class structure, it also helps displace 
middle-class insecurities onto ‘actionable’ fractions of the population. Although likely 
exacerbated by the advent of neoliberalism, perhaps especially by credit liberalisation, 
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the roots of lower- and middle-class anxieties lie in the social, political, and economic 
tensions typical of semi-peripheral societies: the particularly strained dynamics of social 
rights and mobility, political representation and state provision, and labour relations and 
profit-making. Our departure from Wacquant’s model, it follows, turns on more than 
mere semantics; the findings of this article cannot be reconciled with his approach 
simply through expanding the interpretation of neoliberalism to incorporate proximate 
informal manifestations. 
More than that, indiscriminate use of the term can all too easily encourage a collec-
tive amnesia, a focus on the present at the cost of an historically informed perspective. 
Implicit here is the fundamental political problem of being unable to overturn or resist 
a given trend without knowledge of the mechanisms that gave rise to it in the first place 
or may have given rise to it on previous occasions in the past. It is equally important to 
recognise the way in which the concept of neoliberalism can give succour to those 
nationalist agendas – whether of the Right or the Left – which locate the cause of all 
domestic malaise with the ‘foreign finger’ (see further Mazower, 1991). In the case of 
Greece, discourses critical of neoliberalism can thereby function to deflect attention 
from the culpability of local elites and the actual structural weaknesses of the national 
economy, even though foreign pressures are by no means to be ignored. Such effects 
are not dissimilar to what Wacquant (1997) has named in his earlier work ‘the logic of 
the trial’: disowning our own evils by excoriating others. 
At a broader level, the Greek case points to the danger of occidentalist presumptions 
underlying the use of neoliberalism as an explanation for rising levels of punitiveness 
internationally. Theoretical frameworks based on Western experiences of capitalist 
development are problematically applied to states of the semi-periphery, given their 
very different social and economic trajectories. Indeed, by presuming the effective 
‘Americanisation’ of contemporary Greece, the neoliberal penality thesis is no less prone 
than the discourse of ‘globalisation’ to lending neoliberalism appearances of inevitabil-
ity. Just as it is vital to guard against representations of neoliberalism as a necessary 
condition for nation-states to compete in the global economy, so too it is imperative to 
avoid elevating the spread of neoliberalism to the realm of natural universal laws. 
Fatalism enhances vulnerability to ideologies, and these may consist in false pretensions 
of necessity as much as in nationalist ‘logics of the trial’. 
None of the above is meant to dismiss the possibility of a common cause underpin-
ning increasing levels of punitiveness amongst so many societies over recent years. But 
this cause cannot be neoliberalism. 
Notes
For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article, the authors would like to thank Ignacio 
González Sánchez, Nicola Lacey and Fergus McNeill.
 1. According to world-systems theory, ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ states denote the winners and los-
ers of international commodity exchange. ‘A state is core (or peripheral) primarily because its 
production processes are highly profitable (or less profitable) and dominated by capital-intensive 
techniques, high technology, skilled and highly paid labour (or low profit, labour-intensive 
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techniques and coerced low-wage labour). Accordingly, a state is semi-peripheral, first 
because a “fairly even mix” of core-like and periphery-like activities fall within its borders’. 
Additionally, a semi-peripheral state is characterised by particularly sharp political struggles 
‘to affect state structures and policies in favour of [the] respective economic interests [of frac-
tions of the bourgeoisie, workers, and external economic actors]’ (Tayfur, 2003: 21-2). On the 
application of world-systems theory to the political economy of punishment, see further 
Xenakis and Cheliotis (under review). 
 2. A more complete account still would also address immigration detention. Wacquant does 
employ data regarding the length of stay in prison and the variables underpinning it in his 
comparison of ‘carceral evolution’ in the US and France since the mid-1970s, but not when 
making reference to Greece and other jurisdictions such as Spain, Portugal and Italy, which 
prevents testing the argument in uniform depth. Our own analysis draws on data compiled by 
the National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) (see further Cheliotis, 2010a).
 3. In his account of ‘hyperincarceration’ in America, Wacquant himself returns to the early his-
tory of the prison in the sixteenth century in order to show that ‘penal bondage developed, not 
to fight crime, but to dramatise the authority of rulers, and to repress idleness and enforce 
morality among vagrants, beggars, and assorted categories cast adrift by the advent of capital-
ism’. ‘The rise of the prison’, Wacquant concludes, ‘was part and parcel of the building of the 
early modern state to discipline the nascent urban proletariat and to stage sovereignty for the 
benefit of the emerging citizenry. The same is true four centuries later in the dualising metrop-
olis of neoliberal capitalism’ (Wacquant, 2010: 7–8). 
 4. Missing or ignoring the subtotal of pre-trial detainees cannot but understate the scale of impris-
onment, especially since the average duration of pre-trial detention in Greece has in recent 
years been found to far exceed the minimum custodial sentence, and to be the highest in the 
EU (see further Cheliotis, 2010a).
 5. To anticipate crime-control ideologues: the modesty of the rise in crime is by no means the 
product of greater imprisonment (see further Cheliotis, 2010a). 
 6. Victimisation surveys clearly point to the same direction (see further Zarafonitou, 2010).
 7. The imprisonment figures reported in this section do not take account of prisoners held in 
connection with traffic offences.
 8. All this must be set against the background of multifarious disadvantages that render non-
Greeks more likely to get caught in the criminal justice net (see further Cheliotis, 2010a).
 9. Recent changes in the classification of employment categories may have slightly inflated the 
numbers for 2006. 
10. One could also draw attention to the rise in the use of pre-trial detention during the 1980s, as 
this gave way to the rapid expansion in the use of imprisonment under conviction from 1990 
onwards, which marked a qualitative rather than merely quantitative development. In much 
the same vein, one could point to the consistent overrepresentation of working-class popula-
tions in the caseload of convicted prisoners, notwithstanding widening ethno-national dispari-
ties. In fact, the very consistency in the use of imprisonment stands in stark contrast to the 
unevenness of the application of subsequent neoliberal reforms.
11. It is also important to note that, unlike civil servants, public sector workers do not have a right 
to tenure, but are rather recruited on long-term contracts (Spanou, 2008).
12. The Greek National Health Service was established as recently as 1983 (see further Petmesidou, 
2006).
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13. Roma and immigrants, as well as homeless and institutionalised populations, are overrepre-
sented amongst the poorest and most vulnerable, but are excluded from national indices of pov-
erty which draw on Household Budget Surveys (Tsakloglou and Mitrakos, 2006; NSSG, 2010a). 
14. According to a study comparing the provision of state benefits to employees and the contribu-
tion of employees to the state budget (via production and taxation) between 1958 and 1995, 
rising tax ratios and levels of unemployment since the mid-1980s have meant that there was 
no net gain by labour, despite the rise in real wages over the same period (Maniatis, 2003; see 
also Tsakalotos, 2008).
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An error was introduced to page 361 of the article above. Lines 2 and 3 from the top, 
which read ‘As suggested earlier, however, such influence cannot but have been limited 
to aggravating ongoing trends.’ should read instead as follows:
‘There is evidence to suggest that at least part of the prison population at the time con-
sisted of political detainees, whether serving a prescribed portion of their sentence in the 
‘main’ prison system, or awaiting deportation to an island of internal exile, or under 
conviction by civil courts for violations of ‘common’ criminal laws (see, e.g., Kenna, 
2001; Voglis, 2002; Seferiades, 2005).’
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